



A paradigm of pragmatic flexibility: the case of the Ladakhi dialects


International workshop Ego-Evidentiality and the right(s) to know (better) Tübingen April 25–26, 2024





1. Basics – 1.1. Ladakhi dialects surveyed













1.2. Evidentiality

In the crosslinguistic discussion, evidentiality is defined as the (grammatical) marking of information *source*.

From the point of *information* technology, there can be only two sources: either the information comes directly from the sender, and *the sender is the source*, or the information is external to the sender, that is, *it comes from a different source*.

For humans we may say information is personal or reported.



However, evidentiality is also defined as differentiating between 'direct' 'info.'/knwl. = sense perception and (hedged) 'indirect' 'info.'/knwl. = hearsay (external!) & inference (personal!).

What is usually missing in the discussion is the ingrained knowledge of one's own conscious acts plus one's intimate acquaintance with situations, items, and persons within one's personal sphere or *territory of knowledge* (Kamio 1997).

This is more immediate and certain than any knowledge derived from *mere* (i.e., a limited number of) perceptions.

Inference or reasoning may yield a higher certainty than mere perceptions, but it is less private and may more likely interfere with the territory of knowledge of other persons, yielding shared or shareable knowledge – likewise missing.



1.3. Egophorocity

Egophoricity, as the term has come to be appropriated, refers to the special if not equal treatment of the speaker in statements and the addressee in (information-seeking) questions versus all other persons: 1 vs. 2+3 / Q: 2 vs. 1+3

At its very broadest, *egophoricity* is a general phenomenon of linguistically flagging the personal knowledge, experience, or involvement of a conscious self; [...]. More narrowly, egophoricity is the grammaticalised encoding of the personal or privileged knowledge or involvement of a potential speaker (the primary knower) in a represented event or situation. [...] Most typically, a marker that is egophoric is found with first person subjects in declarative sentences and with second person subjects in interrogative sentences. (San Roque, Floyd, Norcliffe 2017: 2)



The more original approach by Tournadre (1994) applies to grammatical markers that specifically refer to (or even index, Agha 1993) the 'ego' or epistemic origo or main speech-act participant (MSAP) in whatever syntactic or semantic role:

- 1. markers of acquaintance; active involvement of subject/origo: *yin* (vs. 'factual' *red*), *yod* (vs. experiential *hdug*, +Lad. *rag*)
- marker of passive, receptive involvement as a goal: byun (vs. exocentric son)
- 3. marker of singular experience of the subject: *myon*; Ladakhi mental verb *šes* 'know' as auxiliary
- 4. marker of endophatic experience of the subject no longer uphold *hdug*, Ladakhi *rag* (though in some languages also *yod* !)



This distinction, however, crosscuts the *evidential* functions of these markers within the full system:

- privileged access (*yin* & *yod*) concerning self and %other,

- direct perception:

immediate perception (*hdug*, *rag*) of other and %self, perception of past events directed towards oneself (*byun*), perception of past events not directed towards oneself (*son*), first experiences (*myon*), endopathic perceptions (*hdug*, *rag*),

- 'factual' or rather pragmatically hedged (*red*, *yod.red*).

- inferential and assumptive (various epistemic markers)

– quotation and hearsay (-s(e) < zer 'say', Ladakhi lo)

Taken together, one might say that the Tibetic 'egophoric'-'evidential' systems differentiate between

X: fully assimilated personal experiences with active involvement within one's territory of information (primary egophoric), versus

Y: numerically limited sense perceptions inclusive passive/ /Z: receptive involvement (secondary egophoric) versus

- inferences and assumptions versus
- (attributable) second-hand knowledge

and versus

Φ: shared/ shareable knowledge and/ or pragmatic hedging. For the abstract use of "X versus Y etc.", see Zemp (workshop call https://old.linguistlist.org/issues/31/31-2972.html)

1.4. A small problem



It's not yours, it's mine! – It's mine, *it's not* yours!. Oops, it's not mine, *it's* hers...



2. The Ladakhi unsystematic 'system'

The 'egophoric'-'evidential' markers of Ladakhi have a prototypical distribution, as known from the standard descriptions of Tibetic 'egophoric'-'evidential' systems.

Table 1 Ladakhi 'evidentials' – schematic

MSAP +ctr	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP –ctr (=OTHER)				
self-evident	experiential (±	'neutral'/			
assertive (X)	visual (Y)	non-visual(Z)	shared/°able (Φ)		
yin / yod	hdug (/ sna'n)	rag	GRD+yin / GEM		

MSAP = Main Speech Act Participant: speaker in statements, addressee in questions, only controlled actions. OTHER = all others. GRD = gerund; GEM = generalised evaluative/ epistemic marker (inferential, generic, generalised for shared knowledge and pragmatic hedging)



Table 2 Prototypical system of Ladakhi 'evidentials'

domain	MSAP +ctr	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP –ctr (/		
	self-evident	experiential (±inferential)	'neutral'/		
	assertive (X	(X) visual (Y) non-vis.(Z)	shared/°-able (Φ)		
future	yin	—	GRD + yin		
past/ anterior	yin	stem II (.PA) + \emptyset			
		(so'n, (byu'n))			
copula identity	yin		GEM		
copula attribute	yin / yod	hdug/ snan rag	GEM		
existential	yod	hdug/ snan rag	(PERF + GEM)		
present/simult.	yod	hdug/ snan rag	—		
habitual/gener.	yod	hdug/ snan rag	NLS+GEM/GRD+yin		
perfect/result.	yin / yod	hdug/ snan rag	GEM		
all verbal domains		OTHER	(& MSAP)		
ev		valuative markers	second hand		
		<i>yin / yod / stem + EM, SEM</i>	lo, zer, mol		

EM = evaluative markers for inferences, probabilities, mental distance GEM = generalised evaluative/ epistemic marker with pragmatic functions SEM = specialised evaluative marker for inferences from non-visual input



As Mushin (in her talk, 2022), states, typological research may well apply predefined categories to a language. But in the field, these categories are rather invisible in natural conversations or at least not or *not always used in a way as expected*.

In my experience, informants, even more so interlocutors in every-day interaction, use markers that one does not expect from the orderly pattern of the standard paradigm, choosing them according to their liking or according the hidden context in their mind (for the latter see Zeisler 2016).



Against the standard descriptions,

X ('self') may be used for OTHER in *statements* (upgrading).

Y ('other') and some other epistemic markers ('other') may be used for the ego or MSAP in *statements* (downgrading).



The choice does not so much depend on more 'objective' features, such as what is the knowledge base (privileged knowledge or not), but on more 'elastic' and/ or more 'subjective' factors, that have to do with the socio-pragmatic interplay between speaker, addressee, and the situation/ person talked about.

The choice has also to do with the *right* to present a certain knowledge as one's own (exclusive) knowledge and with the *willingness to claim* this right in the communicative situation.



In particular:

The (primary) 'egophoric' markers *yin* and *yod* refer to OTHER persons or items – when the *speaker*

a) has exclusive knowledge through active involvement,

b) identifies with/ positively evaluates the situation

c) has the *right to know better* than the addressee.



This right depends

on the relative distance between speaker and addressee (the greater the distance, the greater the right),

on the addresee's knowledge (if the addressee already knows, or in the case of generic facts, the speaker has no right to exclusive personal knowledge/ knowing better),

on the addressee's interests and/ or obligations to know (e.g., in official settings, such as teaching, one should avoid condescending or mansplaining associated with X)



Along a more subjective dimension, a speaker may choose

whether s/he takes a STANCE of identification with the situation and integrates it into his/her personal sphere (X) = upgrading

or

takes a STANCE of distance and presents the situation as not belonging to his/her personal sphere or

takes a STANCE of empathy with the addressee's needs to know

using Y, Φ , or other epistemic markers, EM, as if merely having come to know (by inference or observation) = downgrading



Table 3 Non-Prototypical use: Ladakhi 'evidentials'

Domain	X		Y ($hdug$, zero)* / Φ / EM	
identification	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
future	MSAP	OTHER		
past/ anterior	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
attributive	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
existential	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
present/ simultaneous	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
perfect/ resultative	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
prospective	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
All domains			other markers	
quotation markers			OTHER	

*Y *byun* and *son* are not found with such marked usages, Z *rag* is found infrequently (I have only one example in my data base, below (8)).



The choices for downgrading or upgrading one's stance in statements cannot be predicted, at best they can be interpreted afterwards as being motivated by this or that factor – from a large set of factors that may even contradict each other:

frequency of observation + identification -> assimilated knowledge active involvement acceptance or rejection of responsibility rejection of appropriateness of situation (Y for self; X for others) relative distance to addressee (the more distant the more X) addressee already knows addressee does not know yet but is interested/ obliged to know situation potentially accessible to others openness for further discussion questions of status and feeling of inferiority (or superiority) ...



2.2. Upgrading (> X yin, yod)

Acquaintance through repeated observation or interaction

Dissociation of observation space and observed

Active involvement

Relative distance of speaker to addressee of addressee to situation

Authoritative stance: criticising and accusing (and surprise)

• X, the 'egophoric' marker is frequently based on sensory perceptions, the difference to the use of Y and Z being that these perceptions must have been repeated in a great number or one has become acquainted with the situation by other means, whereas Y and Z signal a limited number of perceptions.

(1) Khardongpa (Ldumrapa/Cenral Ladakhi border dialect, FD 2016) *tiri jul-a mẽ rgatp+ek jot.* Tiri village-ALL grandfather old-LQ exist(X)
'There is an old grandfather in the Tiri village [in eastern Ladakh].' (The informant comments: "I am not a Tiripa, but I go there quite often.")



(2) a. Lehpa (2014, about guests who had left the other day) *khon trekin-a son-ste-jot...* they trekking-LOC *go.PA-CP-X=PERF khon-e dzola bor-te-duk.* they-ERG/GEN bag put-CP-Y=PERF

'They went trekking. (X: Dissociation of observation space and observed) [...] They left their bags [in the room over there].' (Y: The speaker does not want to take responsibility for the bags. The bags are out of view, yet still accessible.) – Getting used to the situation may change the implicit evaluation:

b. Lehpa (2014, about the same absent guests, ten days later) *kb+e dzola bor-te-jot. s/he+GEN/ERG bag put-CP-X=PERF*

'S/he has left/ left his/her bag(s) [in the room over there].' (X: The speaker may have made up with her responsibility or simply got used to it by repeatedly talking about it.)

X indicates one's personal involvement in environments that objectively would not belong to one's TOI.

(10) a. Lingshetpa (Shamskat, Southern Shamma, field data 2016) skara gonpa+(:)

Skara monastery-ALL

gururimpotfhe+(:)sku*(zaŋ-se)-duk.GuruRimpoche+GENhon.statuehon.erect-CP-Y=PERF

'In the Skara monastery, there is a statue of Guru Rimpoche.' (Y: The speaker, not related to the monastery, as he is from a different, far-off village, was not involved in setting up the statue. He has apparently no reason to identify with the situation.)

b. Lingshetpa (Shamskat, Southern Shamma, field data 2016) *skara* gonpa+(:) kargjut sethin *(*zan-se*)-*jot*.
Skara monastery-ALL Bkah.brgyud lineage hon.erect-CP-X=PERF
'In the Skara monastery, there is the Bkah.brgyud lineage.'
(X: The speaker, not related, was involved as painter – and knows and is allowed to know better than the foreigner BZ.)



That means, what is and what is not one's TOI, cannot be defined objectively, but depends on factors such as acquaintance (ruled out in the first case, although it can be presumed that the speaker saw the statue everyday), active involvement (the crucial factor here), or also one's identification with, or one's positive attitude for, the situation described.

It also depends on whom you talk to. If the painter would talk to the monk community of the Skara monastery or to the villagers who frequently visit the monastery, he would not have the right to claim his knowledge as exclusively personal.

The use of X accordingly depends on various social factors:

(3) Faδumpa (Kenhat, Central Zanskarpa, field data 2019)

khonitmanpotã-a-jøt.s/hesleepmuchgive-NLS-X=PRS

'S/he sleeps a lot.'

(This may be said about somebody one knows very well, already for a long time. It could be one's brother, one's best friend, people from one's village; less likely the neighbours in Leh, but this depends: if they are close, if one often meets them at certain occasions in town and if one recognises them as neighbours and then starts visiting each other, then X can be used. – This also depends on whom one tells the situation. If the relationship to the person talked about is closer than to the addressee, X may be used; if one talks to one's family members, then the relationship to the neighbours is weaker, and X cannot be used.)

- X may be used authoritatively for criticism or sarcasms.

The effect is based on the 'deviation' from the expected form, hence upgrading for 2P/3P, but downgrading for 1P, as in (7) and (8) below.

- (4) Teyapa (Shamskat, Eastern Shamma, field data 2013) *ltos-an! tsamfik kha rdan-et!* look.IMP-DM how.much mouth open.wide-X=PRS
 'Look, how [you] are/ [s/he] is yawning!' (X: The speaker shows his/ her indignation.)
- (5) Shachukulpa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2016)

 $\varepsilon t j i$ $p \bar{e} r a$ $t \tilde{a} + a t$,elder.sisterspeechgive+X=PRS $\eta \underline{a} + (i)$ $t s \bar{o} los a$ $p \bar{a} p lo \eta$ $m \underline{a} - ho \eta !!$ I+AESanus.placeput.down.timeNG-come=PST'[Right now,]the elder sister is [calmly] talking [on her phone], and I[even]have no time to shit!!'(X: The speaker shows his/her indignation about how one person shuns the work.)



- 2.3. Downgrading (X yod > Y, Z; X yin > Φ) Rejection of responsibility Non-identification with one's own situation Non-identification with situations within one's TOI Involvement of addressee as co-actor
- Empathy with the addressee or profiling his/her interests or obligations to know



- Accordingly, within one's TOI, one may choose Y instead of X according to one's spontaneous evaluation of the situation and perhaps also one's actual mood
- (6) a. Repeated personal experience, Leh bazaar
 BZ: mar jod-a le? Shopkeeper: mi-ruk. / duk, duk. butter exist(X)-QM hon – NG-exist(Y) exist(Y) exist(Y)
 BZ: 'Do you have butter? <X: I expect you to know, I take you to be responsible.>' – Shopkeeper: 'No, / Yes, there is. <Y: But why do you call upon my responsibility?>'
 - b. Repeated personal experience, same shop & shopkeeper
 BZ: mar dug-a le? Shopkeeper: met. / jot, jot. butter exist(Y)-QM hon - NG.exist(X) exist(X) exist(X)

BZ: 'Do you by chance have butter? < Y: I'm just asking, not claiming your responsibility >' – Shopkeeper: 'Sorry, no. / Yes, of course we have butter. <X: I did what I could / No need to be shy. I know well, it's my shop after all.>' – da capo al infinito ...

• X is not used, when one rejects any closer identification with one's situation, e.g., when feeling shy, or in sarcastic use, highlighting through the mismatch that something is not the way it should be.

The effect is based on the 'deviation' from the expected form, hence downgrading for 1P, but upgrading for 2P/3P, as in (4) and (5) above.

(7) Videos from Zanskar, Kenhat (Maaz Shaik, Caroline Riegel: Arte) naza / na palbatfan (hi)no?. we.excl I poor be(Φ)
'We are / I am just* poor (in contrast to you).'

(In both cases, the addressee is a foreigner, automatically considered to be much richer.)

*In German, one could express this hedging notion with various modal particles, such as *eben*, *halt*, *ja*, *doch*.

(8) Stokpa Kesar epic (Kenhat, Central Ladakhi, recorded 1996) na-nin ama gogza lam+e trhugu, ta I-TOP mother Gogza Lamo+GEN child now mõan-e şaŋthuk inok. woman.bad-GEN street.child $be(\Phi)$ na+(:) tfig-ek mane mi-rak. I+AES one-LQ ever NG-have(Z) naza+(:) mane sakjat mane *mi+ruk*. we.excl+AES ever land ever NG-have(Y) tene na-an sakyat-tfik sal-yos-ok. then I.AES-FM land-LQ hon.give-need-FUT.INF

'As for me, I'm Gogza Lamo's child, (evidentily) a street child, son of a bitch (Φ : bitter sarcasm). (As I can feel,) I do not possess a single thing (on my body), at all! (As I see,) we [mother and I] do not have land, at all (Z/Y: and this is a scandal)! ... [You guys] will need to give me some land.' (Distanced stance, accusation; the speaker already knew; did not just find out. – The speaker is not responsible.)

X is not used, when one rejects any closer identification with the situation, even if this objectively belongs to one's TOI, as in the case of habits of one's family members.

(9) Shachukulpa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2016) ne aba-le zaktan tho sil-uk. / sil-at. I-GEN father-hon every.day religion read-Y=PRS read-X=PRS
'My father reads religious texts every day.'
(Y indicates mere observation; the speaker does not consider him/ herself a religious person or doesn't care about the father's habit. / X indicates that the speaker knows well, does the same thing, or cares about the father's habit.)



The following example shows how a speaker may change his/her stance while describing a communal custom.

Initially, X is used neutrally for a well-known habit. The speaker then switches to Y for a critical or distanced view of the habit. Here the speaker opposes the fact that so much precious food is thrown away. In the second part, X is used for an objective and generally accepted fact (food IS precious), while Y indicates a more subjective evaluation and wish.

(10) Ciktanpa (Shamskat, Eastern Purikpa, field data 2017) mamani-tsana julpa-s zan manmo khjon-ma+t. mamani-when villager-ERG food much bring-NLS+X=HAB dutsek zan khjon-en-duk ki mi-sak dan-se, this.much food bring-CNT-Y=PRS that people-PL be.full-LB torobalan-sag-a tan-ma-rgos-en-duk, cattle.cow-PL-ALL give-NLS-need-CNT-Y=PRS dzap ki zan qamti [qimati] in. when that food precious be(X)mamani-tsana rgos-p+i zan-tfi fi(ŋ)-na, thik duk. mamani-when need-NLS+GEN food-LQ take.out-CD ok be(Y)'At the mamani festival people (always) bring a lot of food (X: neutral stance for a habit in one's TOI). [But] they (always) bring so much food that everybody is full, and one (always) has to give [the rest] to the cattle (Y: critical stance or distanced view of the habit), even though the food is precious (X: objective fact). It would be better (Y: personal view on 3P situation), if one takes out only as much food as needed at the mamani festival."

X is avoided for one's own activities, when the addressee has been involved, since X would indicate that one knows better. Various strategies are found:

(11) a. Gya-Mīrupa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2019) *daŋ* <u>oyo</u> *nēk+e* alu *tōn.* / **tōn-pen.*yesterday we.incl both+ERG potato extract.Y/Z(PST) *extract-X=PST
'Yesterday, we both (you and me) took out the potatoes [from the field].'

b. Gya-Mīrupa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2019)
daŋ <u>natſa</u> nēk+e alu tōn-pen. / *tōn.
yesterday we.excl both+ERG potato extract-X=PST *extract.Y/Z(PST)
'Yesterday, we both (but not you) took out the potatoes [from the field].'



his/her involvement, while the addressee has not.)



 While X can be used to emphasise one's involvement or authorship, it may be avoided out of empathy for the addressee's knowledge gaps or needs to know:

Imagine the following context: speaker S visits his/her sibling, addressee A, who has been absent from the family for, say, five years, and shows some photographs to A.

When S expects that the persons will be recognised immediately, s/he will choose the plain copula X yin.

If S assumes that A may have difficulties to recognise any family member (e.g., parents showing unexpected signs of age, younger siblings having grown up, or even the speaker wearing something very fashionable, etc.), S may choose Φ (*inok* or *intsok*) to ease the knowledge asymmetry.



However, S may choose X, when s/he disregards the knowledge gap, focuses only on his/her own knowledge (or authorship), or demonstrates his/her pride about the fashion-able look.

The choice of X or Φ may thus depend on S's personal attitude towards A. This can be seen as a question of respect or as a question of compassion, and in other situations also as a question of politeness.

(13) a. Tagmacikpa (Shamskat, Western Shamma, field data 2019) ama in / intsok. nati $d_{+}\mathcal{U}$ this-DF we.incl.GEN mother be(X) $be(\Phi)$ 'This is our mother (X: as you surely recognise - or if not, I don't care / Φ : as you might not recognise at once).' (X: signals that A may immediately recognise the represented person or that S does not care about whether A can do so. / Φ : signals that it is a new photo and A might have difficulties to recognise the person [and S cares about filling the knowledge gap].) b. Tagmacikpa (Shamskat, Western Shamma, field data 2019) d₁u ŋa in. / intsok, ŋa stap∫an mi-ndug-a?! ltos-an! look.IMP-DM this₊DF I be(X) be(Φ) I fashionable NG-be.Y-QM 'Look! This is me, am I not fashionable?!' (X: indicates that S feels very proud and expects A to recognise him/her easily. / Φ : indicates that S thinks s/he is difficult to recognise. Y: anticipation of the visual access by the addressee.)



2.4. Same knowledge base, but...


In contrastive (vulgo 'comparative') constructions, the markers depend on one's *attitude towards the contrastee*, hence the inversion of standard and contrastee can lead to a different marker, although the knowledge type concerning each element and the abstract relation of difference between the two members remains exactly the same.

my A is X-bigger than their B, their B is Y-smaller than my A my A is X-younger than their B, their B is Φ -older than my A

The choice of the marker does not depend on word order or on the mentioning both items or the order thereof.


Note that different types of attributes either trigger the existential linking verbs (X yod vs. Y hdug) or the copula (X yin vs. Φ : inok/ intsok)

(14) a Sharapa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2017) standard CONTRASTEE gonpa lē lākaŋ som+esaŋ tchuŋ-a-zik hot. $\mathcal{CAY+}\mathcal{C}$ Cara+GEN monastery Leh temple new+CNTR small-NLS-LQ be(X) 'The Çara monastery is small in contrast to (> is smaller than) the New Temple of Leh.' (X: The speaker talks about the monastery of her village, with which she feels related.) b. Sharapa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2017) standard CONTRASTEE lē lākaŋ soma ŋaz+e gonp+esaŋ tche-a-zik duk. Leh temple new we.excl+GEN monastery+CNTR big-NLS-LQ be(Y) 'The New Temple of Leh is large in contrast (> is larger than) our monastery.' (Y: The speaker does not feel related with the New Temple of Leh and/or has experienced this building only briefly.)



The question of how one has come to know about the difference, a question of evidentiality, matters less than one's personal subjective feeling of relatedness with each of the items.


This subjective feeling of relatedness is, of course, quite elastic: one may or may not show one's relatedness, depending on what actually is the 'we' and the 'they', cf. the graphic that I once drew up for a different context of 'identities':





This is shown in the following example. Although the two monasteries of Tranze and Karša belong to different regions of Zanskar, the speaker, nevertheless, indicates his feeling of belonging to the monastery of Karša, as it is the biggest and most important monastery in Zanskar (I suppose his monastery is affiliated with Karsha).

With respect to Hemis monastery, another one of the most important monasteries of Ladakh, he does not feel this kind of relationship. Hemis is of a different affiliation.





b. Tablepa (Kenhat, Eastern Zanskarpa, field data 2023) standard CONTRASTEE du?. hemi+(:) gonpa naz+e gonp+esan the-a H.+GEN monastery we.excl+GEN monastery+CNTR be.big-NLS be(Y) CONTRASTEE standard naz+e taze+(:) gonpa hemi+(:) gonp+esan thun-a jø?. our.excl T.+GEN monastery H.+GEN monastery-CNTR be.small-NLS be(X) 'The monastery of Hemis is big in contrast to (~ is bigger than) our monastery (as I saw). Our monastery of Tranze is small in contrast to (~ *is smaller than*) the monastery of Hemis (as I know).

Another informant indicated that the choice of the marker may also depend on the assumed knowledge state of the addressee, but this also yields asymmetric results:

(17) a. Ralepa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2023) CONTRASTEE standard hemi gonpa oy+e jul-e gonp+esan Hemis monastery we.incl+GEN village-GEN monastery+CNTR phalanzik thenmo hindak. / hot-(d)ak./ duk. a.lot big $be(\Phi)$ be-EM $be(\mathbf{Y})$ 'The Hemis monastery, in contrast to the monastery of our village, is enourmously big (as you know, since you have seen Hemis / I explain, as you will not know / as I have just seen). $(\Phi (!)$ is used when the addressee is expected to have seen Hemis. / The existential plus EM (epistemic marker) is used when the addressee has not yet seen Hemis. / Y is used when the speaker has just seen Hemis.)



b. Ralepa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2023) CONTRASTEE standard *oye jul-e gonpa hemi gonp+esan* we.incl+GEN village-GEN monastery Hemis monastery+CNTR

phalanzik tfūun hindak. / <u>*hot-(d)ak.</u>

a.lot small $be(\Phi)$

'The monastery of our village, in contrast to the Hemis monastery, is extremely small (Φ : you know that it is very small, since you have seen our monastery).'

*be-EM

(The speaker can assume that everybody in his/her village has seen the village monastery. Whether they have seen Hemis or not does not play a role.) The same *relational* attitude is found with respect to the identification of items as belonging to the speaker and not to the addressee. One would expect that if the speaker knows authoritatively that a particular item is his/her own, then s/he would equally well know that this item is not the addressee's. However, most Ladakhi speakers switch between



X for their own possession and Φ for the (non-) ownership of the addressee.

(So far, only one exception)

(18) Ralepa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2023)

 $\xi i\eta$ $\xi i\eta$ $t \underline{e}$ dzola $p \underline{i} r i$ $m \underline{a} n dak$ / * $m \underline{a} n$ wait=IMPwait=IMPthatbagfam.you.GENNG.be(Φ)*NG.be(X) $\eta + \underline{e}$ / $\eta + \underline{e}$ $m \overline{a} k p + e$ *hin.*/ **hindak*.*NG.be(X)I+GENI+GENhusband-GENbe(X)*be(Φ)*

'Wait, wait! That bag *might not be* yours (Φ : not my sphere/ TOI). / *is definitely not yours. [It]'s definitely mine / my husband's (X: my sphere/ TOI). / **might be* mine. / my husband's.'

I use a modal expression in the translation to show the, from our perspective, oddness of the switch. This does not really fit, as the marker Φ does not express any epistemic hedging. It is not that the speaker has any doubts. What the speaker indicates is that the belongings or not-belongings of the addressee

do not fall into the speaker's territory of information.



3. Conclusion

For the modern Central Tibetan dialects already Bacot (1946: 72-73) stated that the auxiliaries for the 2nd and 3rd person (*red* and *hdug*) can also be used with the 1st person.* He further stated that a chapter on all the exceptions would be longer than a chapter on the rules.

*Of course, he was simplifying the facts, according to the state of the art of his time: it is not at all a question of person marking, but a question of perspectivising.



With that he indicated that there may be a paradigm for the most neutral, prototypical usages,



With that he indicated that there may be a paradigm for the most neutral, prototypical usages,

MSAP +ctr	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP –ctr (=OTHER)					
self-evident	experiential (±i	'neutral'/				
assertive (X)	visual (Y)	non-visual(Z)	shared/°able (Φ)			
yin / yod	ḥdug (/ sna'n)	rag	GRD+yin / GEM			



but that there are many more marked usages, which derive their special markedness through the transgression of the paradigm.



but that there are many more marked usages, which derive their special markedness through the transgression of the paradigm.

Domain		X	Ү / Ф / ЕМ	
identification	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
attributive	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
existential	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP
temporal	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP



One might say that the transgression essentially belongs to the paradigm.

Or that the more objective factor of knowledge access can easily be overridden by subjective or pragmatic factors, and that speakers are free to manipulate the paradigm at will.

Or that the main opposition between X (or the so-called 'egophoric' markers for active involvement) and all other markers addresses a different socio-pragmatic modal dimension, that of personal involvement and responsibility, and particularly the resulting rights to speak.



One might say that the transgression essentially belongs to the paradigm.

Or that the more objective factor of knowledge access can easily be overridden by subjective or pragmatic factors, and that speakers are free to manipulate the paradigm at will.

Or that the main opposition between X (or the so-called 'egophoric' markers for active involvement) and all other markers addresses a different socio-pragmatic modal dimension, that of personal involvement and responsibility, and particularly the resulting rights to speak.



One might say that the transgression essentially belongs to the paradigm.

Or that the more objective factor of knowledge access can easily be overridden by subjective or pragmatic factors, and that speakers are free to manipulate the paradigm at will.

Or that the main opposition between X (or the so-called 'egophoric' markers for active involvement) and all other markers addresses a different socio-pragmatic modal dimension, that of personal involvement and responsibility, and particularly the resulting rights to speak.



Mushin (2012: 270f.) states:

Evidential strategies express aspects of a speaker's epistemological stance towards the information ... They may also convey aspects of a speaker's epistemic attitude towards information ... But a speaker's motivations to adopt evidential strategies does not reflect merely an internal reconciliation of source and attitude. Speakers adopt evidential strategies in social interaction as part of an ongoing negotiation of authority and rights ..., as a resource for social action. Not only may the assertion of direct visual experience be an expression of certainty, it may also be part of a claim to a high degree of epistemic authority over the information. Such claims may be used in a range of activities, including assessments ..., complaints and criticisms ... - contexts where an assertion of epistemic status becomes relevant ...



I do not want to deny that the so-called 'egophoric' markers X *yin* and *yod* have to do with the main speech act participant's privileged access – through acquaintance and active involvement in, and/ or responsibility for, the situation described.

At the same time, one expresses with X a particular attitude of authority, commitment or identification, and claims one's primary epistemic rights to exclusive personal knowledge.

When not using X, one admits or clarifies that one does not have or does not claim to have primary epistemic rights. For the notion of 'epistemic authority' or 'rights' cf. also Grzech (2020).



Having and claiming, however, are two different things.

While having or not having primary epistemic rights can be assessed and analysed by a researcher almost objectively,

claiming or not claiming primary epistemic rights, is an entirely subjective decision of the speaker – and perhaps therefore so often overlooked.

But note: this flexibility is found mainly in statements. When asking, one cannot predict the addressee's mood, and there is very little room for playful variation.


Anticipation in questions works only on the default level.



However, to some extent, it is possible or rather necessary to frame one's question in a downtuned manner using a form of Φ to signal friendly curiosity, while the use of X might have an inquisitory connotation, shifting the responsibility to the addressee.

Downtuning appears to be generally somewhat more acceptable, but it is also more common in the Kenhat (eastern, Upper Ladakhi) dialects, and least possible in the Purikpa-Baltipa dialects in the west.

Upgrading is more restricted, as it might imply an infringement of the territory of information of the addressee. Nevertheless, X is used somewhat more neutrally or 'factually' in the Purikpa-Baltipa dialects.





Some extras (food for thought)



There is reason to treat the Tibetic egophoric markes as being evidential, because they contrast with the experiential /sensory / testimonial and inferential markers,

but there is equal reason to treat them as non-evidential or evidentially neutral, since one does NOT specify how one came to know or, at least, these markers are not experiential, not inferential, not epistemic, thus they are, with respect to evidentiality, "neutral" in Juha's sense, and actually 'factual' as Marius Zemp said for Purik. – Or also in the sense of Kittilä 2019.



But then we have a problem: there are two seemingly evidential 'neutral' markers that are often (or always) in distributional contrast: 'egophoric' and 'factual'. And since they stand in opposition, they cannot be on the same level of epistemic authority.

The second problem is, if you insist that the 'egophoric' markers are part of the evidential system, then the so-called 'factual' or 'neutral' markers must be as well. And both must have a different function to be described in positive terms, e.g., identification vs. backgrounding, distance, downgrading, politeness, ...



A second point: Nicola made a very strong point against a binary division of the semantic space, but I would like to do exactly that:

yin and *yod*, but not *byun*, *myon* or *dgos* refer to the speaker's highest epistemic authority, the speaker's territory of knowledge. That is why these forms can also be applied for 2nd and 3rd person if the speaker is in some way involved (actively or emotionally). – It is not uncontestable, it is actually the only stance that can be contested.

To use any other form signals that you either do not have or do not claim to have highest egophoric authority, and in this semantic domain you will then find the evidential markers in the narrower or stricter, cross-linguistic sense: experiential, inferential, assumptive, probability, etc.



speaker attitude COMMITTED NON-COMMITTED PERSONAL VIS INFER EPIST SHARED

speaker attitude and engagement or grammaticalised intersubjectivity								
territrory of information								
personal authority	personal authority cannot be assumed:							
commitment	evidential (in the narrow sense), epistemic, socio-pragmatic							
involved, responsible, as-	visual,	inferential	e.g.	hearsay	shared or			
sertive ('egophoric')	non-visual		guessing	quotation	shareable			
auxiliaries: yod / yin	hdug, rag	tog~	gro ~	lo	in.hog~			
		sug	haŋ		in.sug			
Habits: +involved,	-involved,	-involved			±involved,			
accustomed,	accute,				neutral			
positive assessment	critical	ne	eutral assess	sment	assessment			
privileged access	limited personal access			non-personal				
claiming epistemic primacy				3P epistemic	establishing			
speaker-hearer knowledge asymmetry				authority	symmetry			



But...

Nicolas is right it is not a simple branching, its rather a complex network, looking perhaps like this (from an old presentation):

