Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung

Beiträge zum deutschen Föderalismus

Bundesverfassungsgerichtliche Neujustierung des Bund-Länder-Verhältnisses im Bereich der Gesetzgebung

Stefanie Schmahl

S. 220-236

The article deals with the impact that the recent jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court has on the relationship between the Federation (Bund) and the Länder in the area of legislation. As regards concurrent legislation, the Court establishes restrictive criteria on the interpretation of the so called requirement clause (Erforderlichkeitsklausel) laid down in article 72 para. 2 of the Basic Law. Especially, the Court holds this clause contrary to what it had decided previously with respect to the former desirability clause (Bedürfnisklausel) as being completely justiciable. Against this background, the Federation will have to prove the necessity of enacting a federal law instead of leaving the area up to the competence of the Länder. Relating to framework legislation, the Court insists that federal laws may establish a mere framework which must leave room for elaborated legislation by the Länder. Directly applicable and detailed rules within framework laws are not allowed, unless they are plainly indis-pensable a fact which the Federation has to prove as well. Also by this jurisprudence, the Court in renouncing earlier statements re-emphasises the autonomy of the Länder. Furthermore, according to the German model of federalism, the Länder cooperate with the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) in a large segment of its legislative work. In numerous cases the legislation is based on an active consent (Zustimmungsgesetze) by the Federal Council (Bundesrat). By that right to veto Federal legislation the Länder exercise a strong substantive influence on the legislative work of the Federal Parliament. To avoid too many vetos, the Bundestag, therefore, regularly splits up the planned federal statute in two different parts, only one of them needing the active consent of the Federal Council. In its recent jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court accepts this practice by relying on the freedom of the legislative power. All in all, the new decisions of the Constitutional Court have to be agreed with. They re-adjust the competences between the Federation and the Länder to the extent envisaged by the constitutional text. Therefore, it is not astonishing that the compromise reached during the constitutional reform process regarding the federal system in November 2005 relies, in major parts, on this jurisprudence.

Zitiervorschlag für diesen Artikel:
Schmahl, Stefanie 2006: Bundesverfassungsgerichtliche Neujustierung des Bund-Länder-Verhältnisses im Bereich der Gesetzgebung, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (Hrsg.): Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2006. Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, S. 220-236.