ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS

ULF R. SCHMERL, Diophantine equations in a fragment of number theory.

We study the following problem: Given a diophantine equation, is it possible to find out whether or not this equation can be proved impossible in the fragment Z_0 of classical first order arithmetic in 0, S, $+, \cdot$, and open induction?

Using proof-theoretic methods we prove the following: Let $r(x_1 \cdots x_n) = s(x_1 \cdots x_n)$ be a diophantine equation in the variables x_1, \ldots, x_n . Then

$$\forall x_1 \cdots x_n [r(x_1 \cdots x_n) \neq s(x_1 \cdots x_n)] \text{ is provable in } Z_0 \Leftrightarrow \exists c \in N \ \forall (\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n) \in I_{x_1 \cdots x_n}^c r(\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n) - s(\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n) | 1 + \mathbf{N}[x_1 \cdots x_n]$$

Here $I_{x_1\cdots x_n}^c = \{0, 1, \dots, c-1, x_1+c\} \times \cdots \times \{0, 1, \dots, c-1, x_n+c\}, 1 + \mathbb{N}[x_1\cdots x_n]$ is the set of polynomials in $x_1 \cdots x_n$ with coefficients from N and constant coefficient $\neq 0$, and $r(\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n) - s(\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n) | 1 + \mathbb{N}[\cdots]$ means that $r(\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n) - s(\hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_n)$, understood as a polynomial from $\mathbb{Z}[x_1 \cdots x_n]$, divides some polynomial in $1 + \mathbb{N}[x_1 \cdots x_n]$.

This characterization still holds when the functions P (predecessor), sg, and \overline{sg} (sign and cosign) are added to Z_0 .

PETER H. SCHMITT, Model- and substructure complete theories of ordered Abelian groups.

In his pioneering paper [1] Yuri Gurevich associated with every ordered Abelian group G for every $n \ge 2$ a coloured chain (i.e. a linear order with additional unary predicates) $\text{Sp}_n(G)$, called the *n*-spine of G, and proved that $G \equiv H$ if and only if $\text{Sp}_n(G) \equiv \text{Sp}_n(H)$ for all $n \ge 2$.

Thus for every elementary class \mathcal{M} of ordered abelian groups there are theories T_n in the language of *n*-spines, such that

$$G \in \mathcal{M}$$
 if and only if $\operatorname{Sp}_n(G) \models T_n$ for all $n \ge 2$.

MAIN THEOREM. If for all $n \ge 2 T_n$ is model complete (substructure complete), then \mathcal{M} is model complete (substructure complete) in a certain definitional extension of the language of ordered groups.

REFERENCE

[1] Y. GUREVICH, Elementary properties of ordered abelian groups, Algebra i Logika Seminar, vol. 3 (1964), pp. 5–39; English translation, American Mathematical Society Translations, ser. 2, vol. 46 (1965), pp. 165–192.

P. SCHROEDER-HEISTER, Natural deduction calculi with rules of higher levels.

Natural deduction calculi, as introduced by S. Jaśkowski and G. Gentzen, differ from Hilbert-type calculi as well as from sequent calculi in that assumptions may be discharged by the application of inference rules. An inference rule in such calculi can be stated as

$$\frac{I_1 \quad I_l}{\underline{A_1 \cdots A_l}}$$

where the Γ 's are (possibly empty) sequences of formulas indicating the assumptions which may be discharged. This concept of a calculus can be generalized in the following way. In the first step one allows not only formulas but also rules as assumptions. If a rule R which does not belong to the basic inference rules of the calculus considered is used in a derivation of a formula A, then A is said to depend on R. In the second step one defines inference rules which allow one to discharge assumptions which are themselves rules. This leads to the concept of rules of arbitrary (finite) levels: A level-0 rule is a formula, a level-1 rule is a rule not allowing one to discharge any assumption (like rules in Hilbert-type systems), and a level(m + 2) rule is a rule allowing one to discharge assumptions which are level-m rules. An example of a level-3 rule is

$$A \Rightarrow B$$

$$A \rightarrow B \qquad C$$

$$C$$

where \rightarrow is the implication sign and $A \Rightarrow B$ is a linear notation for the level-1 rule $\frac{A}{B}$. This level-3 rule is

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS

equivalent to modus ponens. With the help of level-m rules for arbitrary (finite) m, a general schema for introduction and elimination rules for n-place sentential connectives and quantifiers is definable, thus yielding a natural deduction system for logical operators in a generalized sense. Derivations in this system are normalizable. Furthermore, the (functional) completeness of the standard intuitionistic operators \land , \lor , \rightarrow , \bot , \forall and \exists can be proved. The system is not suitable for the interpretation of modal calculi without modifications. So the meaning of level-m rules is somewhat different from the meaning of sequents of higher levels used by K. Došen (*Logical Constants*, Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1980) for the interpretation of various logical systems including modal and relevant logics.

WILFRIED SIEG, A note on König's lemma.

Every finitely branching but infinite tree has an infinite branch. That is König's lemma KL, a most useful tool for mathematical and metamathematical investigations. The Heine/Borel covering theorem and Gödel's completeness theorem, to mention just two examples, can be proved using KL (over a very weak theory; see below). KL can be formulated as an "abstract principle" [2] in the language of second order arithmetic:

KL
$$(\forall f)[\mathscr{T}(f)\&(\forall x)(\exists y)(\ln(y) = x\&f(y) = 0) \rightarrow (\exists g)(\forall x)f(\overline{g}(x)) = 0],$$

where $\mathcal{T}(f)$ abbreviates that $\{x \mid f(x) = 0\}$ forms a finitely branching tree; i.e.

$$(\forall x)(\forall y)(f(x * y) = 0 \to f(x) = 0) & (\forall x)(\exists z)(\forall y)(f(x * \langle y \rangle) = 0 \to y \le z)$$

Over BT (the second order version of PRA together with the comprehension principle for quantifier-free formulas) plus Σ_1^0 -AC₀, KL is equivalent to the full arithmetical choice principle Π_{∞}^0 -AC₀(see [1]). Thus the theory

$$(BT + \Sigma_1^0 - AC_0 + KL) \qquad [(BT + \Sigma_1^0 - AC_0 + \Pi_\infty^1 - IA + KL)]$$

is equivalent to

$$(\Pi^0_\infty - AC_0) \upharpoonright [(\Pi^0_\infty - AC_0)]$$

and consequently [NOT] conservative over elementary number theory z.

In the presence of Σ_2^0 -AC₀, i.e. in effect Π_{∞}^0 -AC₀, KL is equivalent over BT to a version in which a bound for the size of the immediate descendants of a node is given by a function:

 $\operatorname{KL}_{\mathsf{b}} \qquad (\forall f)(\forall g)[\mathscr{T}(f,g) \& (\forall x)(\exists y)(\operatorname{lh}(y) = x \& f(y) = 0) \to (\exists h)(\forall x) f(\bar{h}(x)) = 0]$

where $\mathcal{T}(f,g)$ now abbreviates

$$(\forall x)(\forall y)(f(x * y) = 0 \to f(x) = 0) \& (\forall x)(\forall y)(f(x * \langle y \rangle) = 0 \to y \le g(x)).$$

Kl_b is by itself, however, weaker than KL: if (K) is $(BT + \Sigma_1^0 - AC_0 + \Pi_2^0 - IA + KL_b)$, then (K) is conservative over Z. This is a slight generalization of a result of Kreisel's [2]. For the refined development of analysis and metamathematics (see [4]) other results are more significant.

THEOREM 1. (F) := $(BT + \Sigma_1^0 - AC_0 + \Sigma_1^0 - IA + KL_b)$ is conservative over PRA for Π_2^0 -sentences.

Friedman's theory WKL₀ is essentially (BT + Δ_1^0 -CA + Σ_1^0 -IA + WKL), where WKL is König's lemma for trees of sequences of zeros and ones, and it is contained in (F). So we have as a corollary a result of Friedman's [4]: WKL₀ is conservative over PRA for Π_2^0 -sentences. Note that the examples mentioned above can be proved in WKL₀; indeed, they are equivalent to WKL (see [4]).

Minc [3] formulated a theory S^+ which is $(BT + \Pi_1^0 - CA^- + \Pi_2^0 - IR^-)$; the schemata extending BT are available only for formulas without function parameters. (IR is the induction rule.) WKL for primitive recursive trees can be proved in S^+ and (using it) Gödel's completeness theorem. Minc showed that S^+ is a conservative extension of PRA for Π_2^0 -sentences. This fact is an immediate consequence of the following stronger result.

THEOREM 2. (M):= $(BT + \Sigma_2^0 - AC_0^- + \Pi_2^0 - IR^- + KL_b)$ is conservative over PRA for Π_2^0 -sentences. The arguments for Theorems 1 and 2 are purely proof theoretic.

REFERENCES

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276