Integrating egophoricity into evidentiality or rather:
Integrating evidentiality into speaker attitude?

extended handout

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The cross-linguistic discussion concerning evidentials and egophoric marking mainly turn around the questions whether they are subcategories of epistemic modality or independent categories[1] and whether egophoric marking can be viewed as at subcategory of evidentiality (see the discussion in Widmer 2020), should be seen as evidentially neutral (Aikhenvald 2004), constitutes a somehow related, but nevertheless separate category (Tribur 2019), or is simply part of 'general knowledge' marking (Kittilä 2019). Hardly ever discussed is another category of modality in the wider sence, namely speaker attitude or stance or the speaker's "subjective perspective and strategy" (Tournadre & LaPolla 2014: 241; Oisel 2017: 91). The domains of epistemic modality, evidentiality, and speaker attitude are certainly overlapping, and any given language may address only two or only one of them through grammatical marking, often with extended usages of the respective markers for the remaining domains (see Zeisler 2017: 521f. or 2018: 73 for an attempt at defining these domains).

Evidence or evidentiality was originally a question of information *sources*, cf. Peterson (2000). Technically speaking, information comes either from the sender or via the sender from another source. First-hand information would thus comprise everything one had experienced oneself, through one's agency, witnessing (cf. Plungian 2010: 29, 37 and passim for both), or reasoning, cf. Stenzel (2008) for the last point. Second-hand information or indirect knowledge would be everything that another person or authority communicated. However, most European languages treat hearsay knowledge like uncertain assumptions, and this effect has been observed in non-European languages, as well. This is probably the reason why 'evidentiality' became understood to be a distinction between seemingly certain knowledge or information based on firsthand sensory perception vs. uncertain 'non-firsthand' knowledge or information based on hearsay and inferences or assumptions, cf. the standard definitions by Aikhenvald (2004; 2018: 15, Table 1.1).

To avoid this confusion one could possibly distinguish between personal and non-personal knowledge sources and within personal sources between a) direct, that is, privileged (or intimate or involved) and perceptive (visual, non-visual, endopathic), access, and b) indirect, i.e., inferential and presumptive access, see Table 2, but this is hardly ever done. Plungian (2010: 37) comes closest to this by subsuming non-personal knowledge under indirect access, so that one would get the following contrasts: direct/personal : indirect/personal : indirect/non-personal.

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[1]   See, e.g., Boye (2010) for attempts of mapping evidentiality onto epistemicity; Plungian (2010: 44–49) for an overview over the earlier discussion; Tosun and Vain (2012) for an iteresting discussion of Turkish and English data, which would point to a close relationship of the two categories; Matthewson 2012 for the stark claim, based on rather restricted data, that evidentials are modals and modals evidentials, and thus identical.

	direct	indirect		
		reflected (inference, pre-sumption)	mediated (quotation)	
		personal	non-personal	

Table 1 'Evidential' concepts subsumed under the direct-indirect opposition after Plungian (2001: 353, Fig 2).

Be that as it may, knowledge through own agency, albeit the most direct or most privileged access to knowledge went by the board. It is sometimes included under direct knowledge (as in Plungian's overview 2010: 29, 37), but more often not mentioned or even excluded, as in Aichenvalds various works. Nevertheless, certain languages contrast privileged access to all other kinds of knowledge or allow multiple contrasts with different types of knowledge. What is also frequently missing is the role the addressee's knowledge may play. In many societies, socio-pragmatic conventions or questions of politeness would not allow the speaker to use the same markers for exclusively personal knowledge and shared or shareable knowledge. The question of mutual knowledge or speaker-hearer (a-)symmetry has been recently captured under the term 'engagement' (see Evans, Bergqvist San Roque 2018a/b), but so far, questions of speaker-hearer (a-) symmetry have been mainly addressed for South-American languages (see, e.g., Hintz & Hintz 2014/17, Grzech 2016, 2020). Honkasalo (2019) may be the first for having done so for a Sino-Tibetan language, but similar ideas are now pursued also by others, e.g. Watters (2021). The conceptual map may thus be reorganised as in Table 2.

speaker attitude or engagement or grammaticalised intersubjectivity				
personal			non-personal	
claiming epistemic primacy or authority speaker-hearer knowledge asymmetry			3/(2)P epistemic authority	establishing symmetry
privileged	observed	inferred	hearsay	shared/shareable

Table 2 'Evidential' concepts subsumed under the opposition personal-non-personal and speaker attitude.

In the real world of communicative interaction, neither inferences nor second-hand knowledge are necessarily uncertain. Philosophers will claim that logical inferences lead to better, and more certain knowledge than sensory perceptions (al-Ghazali, Descartes), still better than private experience which lacks the momentum of doubt (Wittgenstein). If one's inferences can be wrong (Kittilä 2019: 1294), so can be all sensory perceptions, just because each perception always implies an inference that the signal in the brain has something to do with something outside, and that this outside thing is exactly the way we perceive it. Alas, how often are we simply wrong. Distractedness may be one reason. Judges would complain about the unreliability of eyewitnesses until they themselves come into a situation where each of the persons present at the occasion give a different description of the crucial item (Melzer, *Die Zeit* 47, 12.11.2020, p. 20). Light effects or short time blackouts may be another reason for misperceptions or wrong memories of particular perceptions (even though I came to know that the car that knocked me over was silver, I only remember it as having seen it being dark blue).

On the other hand, preachers, teachers, and other public ego-shooters expect that their statements are taken to be true, and their victims treat much of this hearsay knowledge accordingly without any hedging markers. Direct quotation gives certain evidence at least about what a person has said, and so a plea of guilty can be produced by third persons as best evidence.

These examples may indicate that whatever goes by the name of 'evidentiality' is not only about *sources* or *types* of knowledge, but also about *how a speaker relates him/herself* towards each type of knowledge and its content, how s/he expects the audience to relate towards the same, and how s/he by his/her own *expressed attitude* towards the conveyed information may try to manipulate the audience's attitudes, cf. Chernela (2012). DeLancey (2018: 593f.) gives a corresponding example. These pragmatic effects are also described as 'empathy' by Häsler (2001). For similar effects in Turkish, cf. also Meriçli (2016). As far as the speaker also takes into account what the addressee knows, this has been treated as 'engagement' (see above). It is, however, not only the question of symmetry or asymmetry in knowledge (*I know what you don't know*) that may count, but the question of whether or not the piece of information *could* be known by the addressee or the wider speech community, in the case of generic knowledge, and possibly also whether the addressee might be interested (or the speaker wants the addressee to be interested) to know more details or to discuss the information or not.

Languages certainly differ in whether the evidential domain is more prominent or that of speaker attitude. I think that at least in most Tibetic languages speaker attitude is more dominant. I should like to demonstrate this with examples from the Tibetic dialects of Ladakh, answering the questions of the workshop call almost point by point. In the following, '**X**' stands for the 'evidential' highest up in the 'evidential' or 'egophoric' hierarchy, '**Y**' and '**Z**' for the contrasting elements on the second and the third position respectively.

(i)   In Ladakhi, **X** (privileged access: *yin* 'be', *yod* 'exist') can be defined against: **Y** (closely observed: *ḥdug* 'exist, appear as' or *snaŋ* 'appear as'), **Z** (perceived: *rag*), and a fuzzy set of inferential, epistemic, and distance markers, see Table 3, Fig. 1, and Table 4.

(ii)   **X** vs. **Y/Z** does not correspond to person or subject categories, but reflect the perspective of the *origo* or main speech act participant (MSAP, speaker in statements, addressee in questions, original speaker in quotation, also known as asserter, epistemic source, etc.) – however, any answer can be formulated according to one's own stance, independent of the perspective suggested by the question, (1), cf. Meriçli (2016) for Turkish; no perspective shift takes place in rhethorical questions, (2).

(iii)   **Y** and **Z** are commonly classified as markers of visual and non-visual perception, (3). **Z** can normally not be applied for non-visual input when (part of) the situation was also visually perceived, see (3), first part. **Y** cannot be applied when observer or observed have left the observation space in which the observer was somehow involved, (4), (5) a, first part. Both markers may also express particular inferences, (6)-(9). Data from a blind speaker, (10), and some unexpected usages of **Y** for non-visual perceptions, (11), indicate that the opposition between **Y** and **Z** is between more immediate, more intense perceptions and somewhat less immediate, less intense, and less certain perceptions, cf. (13).

(iv)   **X**, on the other hand, is frequently based on sensory perceptions, the difference being that in the case of the application of **X**, these perceptions must have been repeated in a great number, (12), or one has become acquainted with the situation by other means, (5) b, whereas **Y** and **Z** signal a limited number of perceptions. In the case of **Z**, we mostly deal with single perceptions. **X**, **Y**, and **Z** thus also express different grades of acquaintance and even certainty, (13).

(v)   Generally, **X** occurs when the situation belongs to the MSAP's personal sphere, when the MSAP is actively involved in, is responsible for, or has the pragmatic authority to represent as personal, the communicated situation, (14). In some dialects, **X** appears for unexpected situations, indicating surprise (15), indignation, (16)-(18), or sarcasms.

(vi)   Not just exceptionally, but rather frequently, **X** *does not occur* when the MSAP does not have the authority to represent a situation as personal, namely in the case of shared or shareable knowledge, (19); further when the MSAP lacks authority and responsibility, (20), and when the MSAP rejects any closer identification with the situation, even if it objectively belongs to his/her personal sphere, (21)-(23), cf. by contrast (24).

(vii) In contrastive (or so-called 'comparative') constructions, the markers depend on the MSAP's *attitude towards the contrastee*, hence inversion of the 'comparison' can lead to a different marker, although the knowledge type concerning the *relation* between the two members remains exactly the same (25)-(26).

(viii) Reduced forms of **Y** became markers of epistemic modality, cf. Zeisler (2017).

(ix)   The opposition between **X** and **Y** developed on the base of their temporal values: generally applicable (*yod* 'exist') vs. limited duration (*ḥdug* 'stay') > unrestricted truth and objectivity (*yod*) vs. limited validity (*ḥdug*) or admirativity. The latter value was used for all sorts of inferences, assumptions or guessings (30)-(29), as well as for first perceptions – *of any person*, cf. Zeisler (2018). These values were inherited when both verbs became regular auxiliaries for present tense/ imperfect and present perfect constructions, leading to a proto-evidential system. Here, I disagree with Zemp (2017 and workshop call), who sees the evolution of the contrast only in the perfect construction.

(x)   Past and future tense constructions remained evidentially neutral for some time before developing similar oppositions, however, with lesser distinctions and a greater residue of neutral applications. Future tense by definition lacks the category of sensory perception, Ladakhi past tense lacks the opposition visual vs. non-visual. Perfect and, to a lesser extent, prospective constructions, on the other hand, may multiply their auxiliaries almost without limit as the auxiliary may take again a prospective or perfect form followed by another auxiliary: for the Faδumpa dialect of Zanskar, I have collected 19 possible combinations and almost as many subtle different interpretations for the sentence 'the neighbours have bought some goats and sheep'.

(xi)   Aspect (in a definable sense) is not a valid grammatical category for Tibetic languages, which mainly encode relative tense or taxis, with the reference time point usually being the utterance time (Zeisler 2004). Ladakhi has developed specific past tense markers, which shift the language more to an ordinary tense system. Aspect-like differenciations of continuative (or progressive) vs. non-progressive forms do not play an important role for the 'evidential' system, except that, depending on the dialect, the continuous

form may appear with with both **X** markers *yod* and *yin*, (27), while the non-continuous form can only appear with *yod*.

(xii) A lexical or semi-grammaticlised *verbum dicendi* can be added to all the above mentioned markers to signal second-hand or hearsay knowledge. While pronouns, honorifics, and subjective evaluation are shifted according to the perspective of the reporting speaker, deixis, illocutionary mood, and the markers of speaker attitude, evidentiality, and/ or epistemicy relating to the perspective of the original speaker are preserved, (28).

Because the MSAP's perspective and the socio-pragmatic restrictions are overarching principles in the Ladakhi dialects, speaker attitude cannot be integrated *into* 'evidentiality'. The opposite seems to hold for languages of the Tibetic type. In these languages, it is less a question of whether the MSAP has privileged access, rather than whether s/he develops or is allowed to develop an attitude of involvement in, and responsibility for, the situation. For a similar notion of 'epistemic authority' or 'rights' cf. also Grzech (2020). The semantic space of speaker attitude is thus divided into a part where the MSAP assumes personal authority and responsibility, and another part where s/he does not or cannot do so. This latter space is then divided into fields of evidentiality in the traditional sensorys, fields of epistemic modality, and fields of socio-pragmatic values. While associated with different descriptive terms and possibly also different pragmatic values, the layered structure suggested here corresponds to that suggested by Widmer (2020, especially 262, Fig. 9.1) for Bunan. Tribur (2019: 126–127) argues along similar lines for a non-inclusion of egophoricity within evidentiality. Although she calls herself agnostic with respect to how the overarching principle should be called, s/he also thinks that both egophoricity and evidentiality may be part of a greater epistemic system (p. 126), however that may be called.

domain	MSAP +ctr	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP –ctr (=OTHER)		
	self-evident	experiential		
	assertive (**X**)	visual (**Y**)	non-visual (**Z**)	neutral /shared/°-eable
future	*yin*	—		GRD + *yin*
past/ anterior	*yin*	stem II (.PA) + ø (*soŋ*, (*byuŋ*))		
copula (identity)	*yin*	—		GEM, SEM
copula (attributive)	*yin / yod*	*ḥdug/ snaŋ*	*rag*	GEM
existential	*yod*	*ḥdug/ snaŋ*	*rag*	(PERF + GEM)
present/ simultaneous	*yod*	*ḥdug/ snaŋ*	*rag*	—
habitual and generic	*yod*	*ḥdug/ snaŋ*	*rag*	NLS / PERF + GEM / GRD + *yin*
perfect/ resultative	*yin / yod*	*ḥdug/ snaŋ*	*rag*	GEM

all verbal domains	OTHER	(& MSAP)
	evaluation	second hand
	yin / yod / stem + EM	*lo, zer, mol*

Table 3 Ladakhi 'evidentials' (prototypical distribution;
in marked applications the distribution of other and msap can be swapped)
GEM = generalised evaluative marker (*yin* & reduced form of *ḥdug* or *snaŋ*)
SEM = specialised evaluative marker (*yin* & (derivation of) *rag*)

Fig. 1   Conceptual layers of knowledge and authority in Ladakhi

SELF	INTERN.	VISUAL	N.VISUAL	INFERENCE	DISTANCE	PROBABILITY	QUOTE	SHARED
Shamskat								
yod *yin*	*rag*	*ḥdug/* *snaŋ*	*rag*	*sug* *bug*	*kha.yin.sug*	*sed*, *ḥaŋ*, (*ḥgro*) (*thig* + AUX) GRD + AUX *tug*	*lo* *zer* *mol*	GEM: *yin.sug*
		→		GEM: *yin.sug*				
			→	SEM: *yin.rag*				
Kenhat								
yod *yin*	*rag*	*ḥdug*	*rag*	*tog* *ḥog~ḥag*	(*sug*) *ka.yin.ḥag*	*ḥgro*, *ḥaŋ* *thig* + AUX GRD + AUX	*lo* *zer* *mol*	GEM: *yin.ḥog* *yin.ḥag*
		→		GEM: *yin.ḥog/ḥag*				
			→	SEM: *yin.rag*				

Table 4 Distribution of the markers for the evidential layers in Ladakhi

(1)   a. Repeated personal experience, Leh bazaar
        BZ: mar   jod-a   le?   –   Shopkeeper: duk,   duk.
          butter   exist(**X**)-QM hon   –   exist(**Y**) exist(**Y**)
        BZ: 'Do you have butter? *<X: I expect you to know, I take you to be responsible.>*'
        – Shopkeeper: 'Yes, there is. *<Y: But why do you call upon my responsibility?>*'

        b. Repeated personal experience, same shop, same shopkeeper
        BZ: mar   dug-a   le?   –   Shopkeeper: jot,   jot.
          butter   exist(**Y**)-QM hon   –   exist(**X**) exist(**X**)
        BZ: 'Do you by chance have butter? *<Y: I'm just asking, not claiming your respon-sibility>*' – Shopkeeper: 'Yes, of course we have butter. *<X: No need to be shy. I know well, it's my shop after all.>* – da capo al infinito … (as I tried in vain to adapt to the shopkeeper's answers and finally stayed with ḥdug.) — Note: I do not think that it has to do with whether the shopkeeper is looking or not, it happened just too often. I couldn't escape the feeling that I was tought a lesson.*

(2)   Teyapa (Field Data 2013)
o   ŋa₊(:)   pene   duk-mi-nuk.   ɲo-a₊(:)   tʃi   ɲo-et?
intj I₊AES money have(**Y**)-NG-have(**Y**) buy-NLS₊LOC what buy-**X**=PRS
'Oh (I see), I have no money [with me], at all. [So] how can I buy anything?'

(3)   a. Domkharpa (FD 2012)
bila-s   maṇe   ton-en-(n)uk.   /   ton-en-(n)ak.
cat-ERG *maṇe* utter-CONT-**Y**=PRS   utter-CONT-**Z**=PRS
'The cat is murmuring *maṇe* [prayers] = is purring (as I see: the cat is in view / as I hear: the cat is out of view).'

b. Sharapa (FD 2016)
taksa   pila   maṇe   tōn-duk.   /   tōn-a-rak.
now   cat   prayer utter-**Y**=PRS   utter-NLS-**Z**=PRS
'The cat is purring now.' (According to the blind speaker: "The cat is close enough that I can feel or touch her." / The cat is behind, out of reach, or outside the room.)

(4)   Ciktanpa (FD 2016)
naniŋ   ŋa   khaŋma₊(:)   lep-tsana,
last.year   I   home₊ALL   arrive-when

ŋatʃi   zanzos tshaŋma-s phjak   be₊(:)n-jotsuk.
we.excl.GEN family all-ERG   prayer   do₊CNT-**Y**=IMPF

daŋ   ŋa   khaŋma-na biŋ-mana, khoŋ   ŋu-in-jot-pin.
yesterday I   home-ABL   go.out-nls& they   cry-CNT-**X**-RM=IMPF

'Last year, when I arrived home, all family members were just praying. Yesterday, when I left home, they were crying.' (In the Purikpa dialects, *jotsuk* is a regular counterpart of past-tense **Y** *duk-pin*. Similar examples have been obtained from various dialects. The ongoing activity upon arrival usually marked with the non-continuative imperfect V-*duk-pin* (**Y**), the ongoing activity upon departure with the continuative imperfect V-*en-jot-pin* (**X**).)

(5)   a. Lehpa (2014, conversation about guests who had left the other day)
khoŋ trekiŋ-a   soŋ-ste-jot.   ... khoŋ-e   dʑola bor-te-duk.
they   trekking-LOC go.PA-CP-**X**=PERF   they-ERG/GEN bag   put-CP-**Y**=PERF
'They went trekking. [...] They left their bags [in the room over there].' (The speaker does not want to take responsibility for the bags. The bags are out of view, yet still accessible.)

b. Lehpa (2014, conversation about the same absent guests, ten days later)
kh₊e   dʑola   bor-te-jot.
s/he₊GEN/ERG bag   put-CP-**X**=PERF
'S/he has left/ left his/her bag(s) [in the room over there].' (The speaker may have made up with her responsibility or simply got used to it by repeatedly talking about it.)

(6)   Tagmacikpa (FD 2019)
deriŋ ɖaŋmo ɖak.   /   duk.
today cold   be(**Z**)   be(**Y**)
'Today I feel cold [independent of the weather]. / Today it is cold (I can see the clouds).' (With respect to the second alternative, the informant comments that

without the clouds one would not be able to *see* that it is cold. Whereas when one *sees* the sun, it is clear that it is warm outside. In both cases, the temparature is merely infered, based on visual input.)

(7)   Shachukulpa (FD 2016)
ʈǖu   a̠ŋmu   duk.   ʧǐa   zer-na,   kho_   _ⁿda·ruk.
child   cold   be(**Y**)   why   say-CD   s/he   tremble-**Y**=PRS
'The child is/ has cold. That is, s/he is shivering.' (The speaker can only infer that the child has cold, upon observing his/her behaviour or looks.) – Cf. Plungian 2010: "speakers cannot have equally reliable information about the physiological state of another person as they may have about their own state. They may only draw conclusion on this state on the basis of some indirect signs."

(8)   Ciktanpa (FD 2017)
di-a   armi   kɛmp-ʧik   ɖak.
this-ALL   army   camp-LQ   exist(**Z**)
'Here is an army camp (as I can hear [the dogs]).' (In Ciktan, people do not hold dogs, but dogs are fed at army camps, so upon hearing the dogs, one can infer that there is a camp.)

(9)   Tiritpa (FD 2002)
daŋ   tshanphet-naphala   ʧhã-ze   ŋa   ʧhol+ts+ak.
yesterday   night.middle-from.onwards   *chaŋ*-INSTR   I   talk.nonsensory+LB+**Z**=PERF
'Yesterday, from the middle of the night onwards, I must have been talking non-sense because of [too much] *chaŋ* (the local beer).' (The speaker is trying to put together what happened the night before, after s/he passed out. S/he may have some distant memory of his/her words or s/he may have also heard some remarks from the other people. However, there is no audible result.)

(10)   a. Sharapa (2016, the blind speaker talking about climbing the Stok glacier)
te̠ne   bat   ma̠ŋpo   ɦoŋ-duk.
then   rockslide   many   come-**Y**=PRS
'Then many [little] rockslides were coming down.' (As the speaker explained: hearing them, feeling them, that is, being hit, 'they came towards me, in front of me').

b. Sharapa (2016, the blind speaker talking about climbing the Stok glacier)
ʈhet   ma̠ŋpo   rak.
slope   many   exist(**Z**)
'There were a lot of [steep] slopes.' (Less directly experienced through the speaker's climbing).

(11)   Kharnakpa (FD 2018)
ŋa̠+(:)   ʨā̠nɖa-naŋ   pē̠ni   du².   /   ʈa².
I+AES   pocket-PPOS   money   have(**Y**)   have(**Z**)
'I have [some] money in my pocket (**Y**: touching the money when groping inside the pocket, which is a bit more sure than / **Z**: only feeling from outside).'

(12) Khardongpa (FD 2016)
tiri   jul-a   mẽ   rgatp·ek   jot.
Tiri   village-ALL   grandfather   old-LQ   exist(**X**)
'There is an old grandfather in the Tiri village [in eastern Ladakh].' (The informant comments: I am not a Tiripa, but I go there quite often.)

(13) Construct Mai 2021, based on data from various dialects and own experience
su-aŋ   met.   / mi-nuk.   / mi-rak.
who-FM   NG.exist(**X**)   NG-exist(**Y**)   NG-exist(**Z**)
'Nobody is here/ there.' (**X**: I know from beforehand, as I am involved, or I have observed many times. / **Y**: I have looked everywhere. / **Z**: I called and didn't get any response.)

(14) Gya-Mīrupa (FD 2013)
p̯alaŋ-a   p̯etse   ɦot.
cow-AES   calf   have(**X**)
'The cow is with a calf.' (The cow belongs to the MSAP, who already knows or is responsible.)

(15) Domkhar (FD 2014)
ar+ekana   laŋpoʧhe   ʧh+et,   d+o-a!
over.there+PPOS:ABL   elephant   go+**X**=PRS   that+DF-LOC
'Wow, [look] at that, over there, there is an elephant walking!' (Both speaker *and* addressee are looking, and the speaker is aware of this; if the speaker thinks s/he alone is looking and if s/he wants to draw the attention of the addressee to the situation, *ɦdug* would be used, only Shamskat dialects, for similar examples in Baltipa, cf. Jones 2009.)

(16) Teyapa (FD 2013)
ltos-aŋ!   tsamʃik   kha   rdaŋ-et!
look.IMP-DIR   how.much   mouth   open.wide-**X**=PRS
'Look, how [you] are/ [s/he] is yawning!' (The speaker shows his/her indignation.)

(17) Shachukulpa (FD 2016)
εʧi   p̄era   tā̇·at,   ŋa̯+(:) tsčlosa   p̄aploŋ   ma̯-ɦoŋ!!
elder.sister speech   give+**X**=PRS   I+AES anus.place   put.down.time   NG-come
'[Right now,] the elder sister is [calmly] talking [on her phone], and I [even] have no time to shit!!' (Working together on the fields, but one person shuns the work.)

(18) Lingshetpa (FD 2016)
kher   de khi! ʈhugu ʤiks-ek,   / ʤiks-et,
take.way.IMP that dog child be.afraid-**Y**=PRS   be.afraid-**X**=PRS
thoŋ-ma-thoŋ?!
see-NG-see
'Take that dog away! Don't you see (lit. You did not see at all) that the child is afraid?!' ([Could be said about an unrelated child, seen crying; **Y** would be used neutrally,] assuming authority with **X** makes it more urgent.)

(19)   Lehpa dialog-type
     ŋeraŋ-e   jul-a   ʧi   joŋ-**a·nok?**
     hon.you-GEN   country-ALL   what   come-**NLS·GEM=DPG**

     nas   joŋ-anog-a?   ʈo   joŋ-**a·nog**-a?   –
     barley come-NLS.GEM-QM wheat come-**NLS·GEM=DPG**-QM

     ŋaʧi   jul-a   nas-aŋ   joŋ-**a·nok,**
     we.excl.GEN country-ALL barley-FM come-**NLS·GEM=DPG**

     ʈo-aŋ   joŋ-anok.   inaŋ ɖas joŋ-**a-ma·nok.**
     wheat-FM come-NLS·GEM=DPG but rice come-**NLS-NG·GEM=DPG**
     'What [kind of crops] are (**generally**) growing (lit. coming) in your country? Do you (**generally**) have (lit. does come) barley? Do you (**generally**) have wheat? – In our country we (**generally**) have barley as well as wheat. But we (**generally**) don't grow rice.'

(20)   a. Lingshetpa (FD 2016)
     skara gonpa+(:)   guru rimpoʧhe+(:) sku   *(ʒaŋ-se)-duk.
     Skara monastery-ALL Guru Rimpoche+GEN hon.statue hon.erect-CP-**Y**=PERF
     'In the Skara monastery, there is a statue of Guru Rimpoche (Padma Sambhava).' (The speaker, who does not feel related to the monastery, as he is from a different, far-off village, was not involved in setting up the statue.)

     b. Lingshetpa (FD 2016)
     skara gonpa+(:)   kargjut   seʈhiŋ   *(ʒaŋ-se)-jot.
     Skara monastery-ALL *Bkaḥ.brgyud* lineage hon.erect-CP-**X**=PERF
     'In the Skara monastery, there is the *Bkaḥ.brgyud* lineage.' (The speaker was involved as painter.)

     Pragmatics of politeness generally make a perfect construction with a honorific full verb preferable to the plain existential, even when simply talking just about what is there in the monastery; some speakers would not use the plain existential, at all.

(21)   a. Sharapa (FD 2017)
     ŋ+e   aʨo   ʐaktaŋ le ʨé-at.
     I+GEN elder.brother every.day work do-**X**=PRS
     'My elder brother works every day.' (The habit is appreciated.)

     b. Sharapa (FD 2017)
     ŋaʐ+e   aʨo   ʐaktaŋ sigret thuŋ-duk.
     we.excl+GEN elder.brother every.day cigarette drink-**Y**=PRS
     'Our elder brother smokes cigarettes every day.' (The speaker doesn't like the habit.)

     c. Shachukulpa (FD 2016)
     ŋe   aba-le   ʐaktaŋ ʧho sil-uk.   / sil-at.
     I-GEN father-hon every.day religion read-**Y**=PRS   read-**X**=PRS
     'My father reads religious texts every day.' (**Y** indicates mere observation; the speaker does not consider him/herself a religious person or doesn't care about the father's habit. / **X** indicates that the speaker knows well, does the same thing, or cares about the father's habit.)

(22)   Ciktanpa (FD 2017)

mamani-tsana julpa-s   zan   maŋmo   khjoŋ-ma+t.
mamani-when   villager-ERG food   much   bring-NLS+**X**=HAB

dutsek   zan   khjoŋ-en-duk   ki   mi-sak   ɖaŋ-se,
this.much food   bring-CNT-**Y**=PRS   that people-PL be.full-LB

ʈorobalaŋ-sag-a   taŋ-ma-rgos-en-duk,
cattle.cow-PL-ALL give-NLS-need-CNT-**Y**=PRS

ʤap   ki   zan   qamti [qimati]   in.
when   that food   precious   be(**X**)

mamani-tsana rgos-p+i   zan-ʧi   fi(ŋ)-na,   ʈhik   duk.
mamani-when   need-NLS+GEN food-LQ   take.out-CD   ok   be(**Y**)

'At the mamani festival people always bring a lot of food. [But] they bring so much food that everybody is full, and one has to give [the rest] to the cattle, even though the food is precious. It would be better, if one takes out only as much food as needed (lit. if [one] takes out the needed food, it is ok) at the mamani festival.' [**X** is used neutrally for a well-known habit. / **Y** is used for a critical or distanced view of the habit. Here the speaker opposes the fact that so much precious food is thrown away. In the second part, **X** is used for an objective fact (food IS precious),] <*while* **Y** *indicates a more subjective evaluation and wish.*>

(23)   a. Gya-Mīrupa (FD 2008)

khi   khor-zane,   am+e   tāŋse   ne   si+ɦuk.
threshing   turn-when   mother+ERG   always   barley winnow+**Y**=PRS

'During threshing, [our] mother always winnows the barley.' (This is actually a situation, quite familiar to the informant. But the speaker does not do this work and also does not want to do it.)

b. Gya-Mīrupa (FD 2008)

l̪aday+e   ama   tshaŋma tāŋse   piŋmo   tsūk-te-da+ruk.
Ladakh+GEN   mother   all   always   knee   plant-LB-sit-**Y**=PRS

'Ladakhi women always sit/ kneel with one knee up and the other touching the ground.' (This is, of course, a generic fact, every Ladakhi knows. But the speaker does not want to be part of this tradition anymore and distantiates him/herself from this custom.)

(24)   Faδumpa (2019)

kho   ɲit   maŋpo   tã-a-jɵt.
s/he   sleep   much   give-NLS-**X**=PRS

'S/he sleeps a lot.'
(This may be said about about somebody one knows very well, already for a long time. It could be one's brother, one's best friend, people from one's village; less likely the neighbours in Leh, but this depends: if they are close, if one often meets them at certain occasions in town and if one recognises them as neighbours and then starts visiting each other, then the non-experiential present can be used. – This also depends on whom one tells the situation. If the relationship to the person talked about is closer than to the addressee, the non-experiential present may be used; if one talks to one's family members, then the relationship to the neighbours is weaker, and the non-experiential present cannot be used.)

(25)   a. Sharapa (FD 2017)
çar+e   gonpa   lē   lākaŋ   som+esaŋ   tɕhuŋ-a-ʐik   ɦot.
Çara+GEN   monastery Leh   temple   new+CNTR   small-NLS-LQ be(**X**)
'The Çara monastery is small in contrast to (> *is smaller than*) the New Temple of Leh.' (The speaker talks about the monastery of her village, with which she feels related.)

b. Sharapa (FD 2017)
lē   lākaŋ   soma   ŋaʐ+e   gonp+esaŋ   tɕhe-a-ʐik   duk.
Leh   temple   new   we.excl+GEN   monastery+CNTR   big-NLS-LQ   be(**Y**)
'The New Temple of Leh is large in contrast (> *is larger than*) our monastery.' (The speaker does not feel related and/or has experienced this building only briefly.)

(26)   Tagmacigpa (FD 2019)
domkhar-i   gonpa-basaŋ   tagmatʃig-i   gonpa   ɽniŋ-ba   in.
Domkhar-GEN monastery-CNTR Tagmacik-GEN monastery be.old-NLS be(**X**)

tagmatʃig-i   gonpa-basaŋ   domkhar-i   gonpa   soma   intsok.
Tagmacik-GEN monastery-CNTR Domkhar-GEN monastery new   be(GEM~'factual')
'The monastery of Tagmacik [that is, <u>ours,</u>] is older than the monastery of Domkhar. The monastery of Domkhar [that is, <u>theirs,</u>] is newer than the monastery of Tagmacik.'

The generalised evaluative marker (GEM) has many functions; here, it indicates that the speaker has certain certain (and shared) knowledge (Domkhar is just on the other side of the river, and the people of both villages have mutual relationships), but does not belong there, whereas the copula expresses her belonging and identification.

(27)   a. Khardongpa (FD 2016)
taksa   ŋa ige+ik   %ɖi+(:)ne-jot.   / ɖi+(:)ne-in.
now   I   letter+LQ   %write+CNT-**X**=CNT.PRS   write+CNT-**X**=CNT.PRS
'I am writing a letter now.' (The continuous form with *yod* implies that the activity already started; it also implies a longer duration, so it would be more appropriate for writing a book. / The continuous form with *yin* implies that the activity is only of a short duration and thus is more appropriate for a letter.)

b. Kargyampa (FD 2016)
ŋa kītap sil-en-ɦot.   / sil-en-in.
I   book   read-CNT-**X**=CNT.PRS   read-CNT-**X**=CNT.PRS
'I am (in the middle of) reading the book (on and off). / I am (actually in the middle of) reading the book (as you can see).'

(28)   Tagmacikpa (FD 2019)
«lo sumtʃu-isŋonla   leho-s-aŋ   itʃu-iskorla   pata   tʃos-pin»   lo.
year 30-PPOS   LEHO-ERG-FM   bird-PPOS   knowledge do.PA-RM=I QOM
«de-tsana   ‹mi-ŋun-la   itʃu-i   ʒak   gana   ɽtsi-et?
that-when   people-PL-ALL bird-GEN   day   how   celebrate-Ie=PRS
itʃu-i   phantoks-iskorla   pata   min-duk›   sam»   lo.
bird-GEN   benefit-PPOS   knowledge   NG-have(**Y**) think   QOM

«*inaŋ   sŋonm+e   mi-ŋun-la   pata   maŋbo   jot-e-intsok»   lo.*
but   early+GEN person-PL-ALL knowledge much   have-LB-GEM=PERF   QOM
« ‹*ŋaraŋ   ṭakpo   in,   khoŋ-a   /es-a-met-sok›*
I.self   strong   be=Ic   they-AES   know-NLS-NG.EX-INF/DST
sam-[r]go+/a-men»   **zer-en-ak-pin.**   *otsok-/ik   lo.*
think-need+GRD-NG.Ic=DFUT   say-CNT-**Z**-RM=IMPF   that.like-LQ   say

'[He] said «30 years ago [we from] leho have also promoted knowledge about the birds.» [He] said «at that time I thought ‹how could [one] ever celebrate a bird's day for the people, [as they] have no knowledge about the birds.» [He] said «but if one looks [more] closely, the people of the past had great wisdom (as I found out).» [He] **said something along the lines** «one should not think: ‹I am the best, they don't know anything›» [He] said something like this.'

While the quote marker lo is used after every sentence, indicating a faithful representation of what has been said, the use of a verbum dicendi, may indicate that one is somewhat less sure, just remembering, not listening clearly; one had got sleepy after lunch; but it may also be used to show one's distance in the case of repeated "good advice".

(29)   *Mkhas.paḥi dgaḥ.ston* (1545)
«*lha.yul   gnam-nas   ḥoŋs-pa+ḥi   btsan.po+r   ḥdug |*
god.land   heaven-ABL   come.PA-NLS+GEN   scion+LOC   **ADMIR**.exist/be
ḥdi-la   bdag.cag   rje.bo   žu-dgos»   zer ||
this-LOC   we.excl   lord   request-need say

'«[He] <u>appears/ seems to be/ is probably</u> a scion who has come from the country of gods, the heaven. We should request him [to become our] lord», [they] said.' (Haarh 1969: 175).'

The presumed identity cannot be immediately perceived, it is either assumed or inferred (the story usually has it that the person upon being asked where he comes from points to the mountain top or sky). Variants of the story show the *V-par-ḥdug* or also *V-ḥdug* construction, with identical function.

(30)   *Mi.la.ras.paḥi rnam.thar* (15th c.)

       da   bla.ma   ḥdi+s-ni   ḥbul.ba   med-pa+r
       now   lama   this+ERG-TOP gift   NG.have-NLS+LOC

       gdams.ŋag   <u>mi-gnaŋ-ba+r-ḥdug</u> |
       teaching   NG1-grant-NLS+LOC-**ADMIR**.exist

       gzhan-du   phyin-ruŋ   ḥbul.ba   mi-dgos-pa-ni   mi-yoŋ |
       other-LOC   go-possible gift   NG1-want-NLS-TOP   NG1-come.PRS

       nor   med-pa+s   chos-ni   <u>mi-thob-pa+r-ḥdug</u> |
       wealth NG.have-NLS+INSTR   religion-TOP   NG1-get-NLS+LOC-**ADMIR**.exist

       chos.med-kyi   mi.lus   sdig-sog.pa-las-ni   lceb-pa   dgaḥ |
       religion.less-GEN   man.body   sin-etc-ABL-TOP   jump.to.death-NLS   like

       da   ci   drag-na   ci   drag-na   sñam-pa-la | *yaŋ*
       now what feel-LOC what feel-LOC   think-NLS-LOC again

       phyug.po   chen.po-žig-gi   g'yog   byas-pa+ḥi   gla   bsags-nas
       rich   great-LQ-GEN   servant do.PA-NLS+GEN   wages accumulate.PA-ABL

       chos   žu-ba+ḥi   rgyags.yon   ḥdra   ḥbyor-ram |
       religion request.PRS-NLS+GEN   provisions.fee similar obtain.PRS-QM

       yaŋ.na las   ŋan.po+s   mthu.thoŋs   yod-pa+s
       or   work   bad+INSTR   magic.effectivity   have-NLS+INSTR

       yul-du   phyin-ruŋ   <u>chog-pa+r-ḥdug</u> |
       village-LOC   go-possible   be.alright-NLS+LOC-ADMIR.exist/be

       'Now, without a gift, this *lama* <u>is not likely to bestow</u> the teachings [on me]. [But] even if I go to somebody else, it is not possible (lit. it does not come) [that that one] does not want a gift. Having no wealth, <u>it seems that I won't get</u> any religious teachings. This sinful etc. human body without any religious teaching, I'd rather like to leave it behind. [I] was pondering again and again, what would be (lit: feels) [right]: should I again try to accumulate wages as a servant for some rich bigman and would I then obtain some sort of provisions or fees, [enough] for asking for the religious teachings? Or <u>would it not seem to be better</u> to go to the villages [and perform some miracles], having enough magic effectivity through [my earlier] bad deeds?' (de Jong 1959: 68.6–12)

       The construction *V-par-ḥdug* is used here for an assumption, reasoning, and imagination. None of this relates to certain knowledge.

Abbreviations and conventions:

"=": **'equals' (not a clitic marker)!** **X**: privileged access: *yin, yod*; **Y**: (visually) observed: *ḥdug*; **Z**: (non-visually) perceived: *rag*; **ABL**: ablative; **ADMIR**: admirative; **AES**: aesthetive (allative for the experiencer subject); **ALL**: allative; **CD**: conditional; **CNT**: continuative (obligatory in non-origo present/ imperfect tenses in Western Sham and Purik, thus leading to neutral present/imperfect tenses); **CNTR**: contrast; **CV**: converb marker; **DF**: definiteness marker; **DIR**: directive marker (for commands and prohibitions); **ERG**: ergative; **excl**: exclusive plural; **FM**: focus marker; **GEM**: generalised evaluative marker; **GEN**: genitive; **HAB**: habitual; **hon**: honorific; **IMP**: imperative; **IMPF**: imperfect; **INSTR**: instrumental; **LOC**: locative; **LQ**: limiting quantifier ('a', 'some'); **NG**: negation; **NLS**: nominaliser; **PA**: past or past stem; **PERF**: perfect; **PL**: plural; **PPOS**: postposition; **PRS**: present or present stem; **QM**: question marker; **RM**: remotenes marker; **TOP**: topic marker.

Angled brackets with italics indicate my interpretation – which is based on discussions with informants and logical reasoning, but not confirmed by the respective speaker. Square brackets and no italics are used for explanations given by the respective informant with other, similar examples.

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